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Abstract
Prospects for normative consensus between probabilists and advocates of the ne-
cessity calculus are nuanced. Necessity syntactically restates some probability distri-
butions orderings and satisﬁes Coxs ‘‘probabilistic’’ reasonableness standards, as
possibility is now known to do. Used as a possibilistic tie breaker, necessity both restates
probabilistic orderings and brings possibility closer to de Finettis quasi-additive stan-
dard. Nevertheless, variations in necessitys credal orderings when beliefs change strain
consensus. Moreover, in domains like the evaluation of scientiﬁc hypotheses, mathe-
matical conjectures, and judicial ﬁndings, the negation of a hypothesis, needed to deﬁne
necessity, may be ill-speciﬁed. Necessity may be less helpful to possibility in those do-
mains, where professions of ‘‘belief’’ sometimes reﬂect not only credibility but also
utilitarian or aesthetic preferences. Unbroken ties allow possibility to express both
credibility and preference simultaneously.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The possibility calculus [1] evaluates disjunctions according to the rule
PðA _ BÞ ¼ maxðPðAÞ;PðBÞÞ
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By convention, a tautology has a possibility of unity. Under uncertainty, at
least one non-tautological sentence must also have a possibility of unity, so
that the max rule yields the conventional value for the tautology. A con-
tradiction has the value of zero, and that value is typically reserved for known
falsehoods. Throughout the paper, and regardless of the calculus being dis-
cussed, it is assumed that the domain of sentences being evaluated is ﬁnite.
Possibility has sometimes been portrayed as fundamentally diﬀerent from
probabilistic approaches to uncertainty. However, there were well-known
similarities [2] among possibility, operations involving probability intervals,
and the Dempster–Shafer calculus, which was itself originally proposed as an
innovation in Bayesian technique [3].
More recently, closer connections between probability and possibility have
been uncovered. These concern the similar semantics for default reasoning
provided by the two calculi, their satisfaction of Coxs [4] criteria for credal
reasonableness, and the ability to translate syntactically between all possibi-
listic and some probabilistic orderings.
Necessity is deﬁned as
NðAÞ  1Pð:AÞ
Necessity may be used alone, or else together with possibility for what will be
called ‘‘tie breaking.’’ For example, if A is a tautology, and B is an uncertain
sentence containing an atom whose possibility is unity, then the possibilities tie
at unity, but
NðAÞ > NðBÞ
The ability to distinguish tautologies from uncertainties has obvious appeal.
The next section reviews results about the reasonableness of the possibility
calculus from a probabilist perspective, including some new clariﬁcations
which reﬂect the views of non-Bayesian probabilists. Against that background,
the paper then examines necessity.
By itself, necessity possesses ‘‘probabilistic’’ features similar to those of
possibility. Some of its tie-breaking behavior in concert with possibility also
has normative appeal for probabilists. Many probabilists dissent, however,
from an aspect of necessitys performance, both alone and as a tie breaker,
during belief revision.
In the later sections, the paper considers uncertain domains where properties
diﬀerent from those oﬀered by necessity might be desirable. In these domains,
the range of alternative hypotheses, and hence the ‘‘not A’’ upon which the
deﬁnition of necessity depends, may be unknown. Hypothesis evaluation
within these domains reﬂects not just relative credibility, but also preferences
among competing hypotheses. Possibility can accomplish such a dual-purpose
representation, provided that possibilistic ties are left unbroken.
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2. The probabilistic reasonableness of possibility
Orderings of sentences based on possibility values respect the constraint
if A) B; then B is ranked no less than A
This behavior is a widely accepted criterion of intuitive credibility ordering
identiﬁed by Łukasiewicz [5] and revived by Sugeno [6]. Probability is another
familiar example of a Łukasiewicz–Sugeno calculus, as are the ordinary
Boolean logic and Łukasiewicz multivalued logics, the ancestors of what are
now more commonly known as ‘‘fuzzy’’ logics.
Considerable similarity between possibility and probability prevails in
connection with conditional logics and default reasoning [7]. A particular class
of probability distributions faithfully emulates the behavior of the default
entailment connective [8].
These atomic bound probabilities solve simultaneous constraint systems
whose typical constraint is
pðxÞ >
X
all atoms y inferior to x
pðyÞ
for each atom x among the sentences under consideration. Between distinct
atoms, either one is inferior to the other, or else there is no constrained order
between them, in which case they share the same lower bound constraint ex-
pression.
For those atoms which have no inferior atoms, their constraint is simply
that of being strictly positive. Thus all atoms are ordered strictly ahead of
falsehoods, an assumption that will always hold throughout this paper,
whatever the calculus. The only other constraint in an atomic bound system is
total probability, that the sum of the atomic probabilities is unity.
Strict atomic bound systems are those in which every pair of atoms is
constrained to be ordered. An example solution over the ﬁve exclusive and
exhaustive sentences a through e is:
pðaÞ ¼ 16=31; pðbÞ ¼ 8=31; pðcÞ ¼ 4=31;
pðdÞ ¼ 2=31; pðeÞ ¼ 1=31
For all mutually exclusive sentences A and B, strict atomic bound probabilities
follow the possibilistic max rule, that is, pðAÞ > pðBÞ just when the highest
probability atom in A _ B is in A and not in B.
As is well known, possibility distributions also achieve emulation of the
default rules. Of particular interest are the linear possibilities [9], those where
each atomic sentence has a distinct possibility value. Linear possibilities apply
the same ordinal rule about highest possibility atoms as strict atomic bound
probabilities. It is easy to see that when the calculi agree about the order of the
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atoms, they are also in ordinal agreement for all other mutually exclusive
sentences.
Agreement for exclusive sentences entails a more extensive relationship
between the calculi. An ordinal property of all probability distributions, whose
normative desirability was emphasized by Bruno de Finetti [10], is called quasi-
additivity,
pðAÞP pðBÞ () pðA:BÞP pðB:AÞ
When strict atomic bound probabilities and linear possibilities agree for the
mutually exclusive A:B and B:A,
pðAÞP pðBÞ () PðA:BÞP PðB:AÞ ð1Þ
Conversely, using a standard possibilistic relationship,
PðAÞP PðBÞ () PðAÞP PðB:AÞ
we ﬁnd, based upon agreement for exclusive sentences A and B:A,
PðAÞP PðBÞ () pðAÞP pðB:AÞ ð2Þ
Results (1) and (2) say that orderings of strict atomic bound probabilities
and those of linear possibility are syntactic restatements of one another. Any
comparative thought expressed in one calculus has its corresponding expres-
sion in the other calculus. The translation in either direction can be accom-
plished mechanically. If one calculus is ‘‘reasonable’’ by some ordinal standard,
then so is the other.
Since many normative arguments advanced by probabilists are ordinal in
character, ordinal reasonableness should moot portrayals of possibility as
normatively inferior to probability, or vice versa. That linear possibilities also
solve the equations advanced in Coxs theorem [11], a pillar of probabilist
normative argumentation, should secure the point.
Cox [12] argued further that sets of probability distributions, and not just
individual measures, are reasonable representations of belief. If Coxs view-
point is adopted, then all possibilities would be normatively acceptable in a
probabilistic sense, not just the linear ones.
This expanded view of possibilistic reasonableness was discussed in [11],
based on the observation that general possibilities syntactically describe sets of
linear possibilities [9]. The orderings of general possibility distributions also
have a direct syntactical relationship to the partial orderings expressed by
general atomic bound solution sets.
A set of probabilities is said to express some ordinal relationship, e.g. A is
ranked ahead of B, just when that order holds true in every distribution in the
set, pðAÞ > pðBÞ. Suppose S is the solution set of a general atomic bound
system. It can be shown that the only ordering assertions between distinct
sentences which are displayed by every probability in S are strict orderings [8].
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Suppose further that Pð Þ is any possibility where, for all atoms a and b in
the domain of the distributions belonging to S,
pðaÞ > pðbÞ () a >
 b
pðaÞ ¼ pðbÞ otherwise
In this section and the next, the relational operator ‘‘>
’’ means a strict or-
dering assertion which is true in every distribution in S.
Since all probabilities are quasi-additive,
A >
 B() A:B >
 B:A
So, by similar arguments as were used to derive (1),
A >
 B() PðA:BÞ > PðB:AÞ ð3aÞ
Since possibility is completely ordered, and the alternative to A >
 B or B >
 A
for distinct sentences is that A and B are unordered with respect to one another,
A unordered w:r:t: distinct B() PðA:BÞ ¼ PðB:AÞ ð3bÞ
For the expression of possibilistic orderings by the set S, we use the easily
veriﬁed possibilistic relationship
PðAÞ > PðBÞ () PðA:BÞ > PðBÞ
to derive
PðAÞ > PðBÞ () A:B >
 B ð4aÞ
and since possibility is completely ordered,
PðAÞ ¼ PðBÞ () neither A:B >
 B nor B:A >
 A ð4bÞ
3. Necessity’s static reasonableness alone and when breaking ties
Necessitys orderings also express comparative ‘‘thoughts’’ in possibilistic
terms:
NðAÞPNðBÞ () Pð:BÞP Pð:AÞ ð5Þ
No special analysis is required to conﬁrm the Cox-reasonableness of necessity,
since in general any function of a Cox-reasonable belief representation is itself
Cox-reasonable.
Necessity inherits linear possibilitys ability to restate the strict atomic
bound orderings and general possibilitys restatement of the strict orderings in
an atomic bound solution set. For necessity based on linear possibility, ex-
pressions (1), (2), (5), and DeMorgans law imply
pðAÞP pðBÞ () NðA _ :BÞPNðB _ :AÞ ð6Þ
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NðAÞPNðBÞ () pðA _ :BÞP pðBÞ ð7Þ
For necessity based upon general possibility, expressions (3a,b) and (4a,b) give
A >
 B() PðA:BÞ > PðB:AÞ () NðA _ :BÞ > NðB _ :AÞ ð8aÞ
A unordered w:r:t: distinct B() NðA _ :BÞ ¼ NðB _ :AÞ ð8bÞ
NðAÞ > NðBÞ () Pð:BÞ > Pð:AÞ () A:B >
 :A
() A >
 B _ :A ð9aÞ
NðAÞ ¼ NðBÞ () neither A >
 B _ :A nor B >
 A _ :B ð9bÞ
So, necessity orderings are fully expressive restatements of particular proba-
bilistic orderings.
To discuss the reasonableness of necessity in possibilistic tie breaking, it is
convenient to combine the two calculi into a single ordering,
A weakly precedes B) PðAÞP PðBÞ
A strictly precedes B() PðAÞ > PðBÞ or Pð:BÞ > Pð:AÞ
A simple way to realize this ordering is to create a composite function, such
as has been suggested in other contexts (e.g., in [2]),
f ðAÞ ¼ ½PðAÞ þ NðAÞ=2
This composition is possible since the necessity of all sentences whose possi-
bility is less than unity is zero. No information about the possibilities and
necessities is lost in computing f ð Þ, since
f ðAÞ < 1=2) PðAÞ ¼ 2f ðAÞ; NðAÞ ¼ 0
otherwise PðAÞ ¼ 1; NðAÞ ¼ 2½f ðAÞ  1=2
The ordering based on f ð Þ is transitive, and so linear or one dimensional.
It is sometimes said (e.g., [13]) that combining necessity and possibility oﬀers
two dimensions of information about uncertainties, i.e. credibility is valued by
two numbers rather than one. Or, the two numbers might be used to deﬁne
intervals which run from the necessity value to the possibility value for each
sentence. Thus each interval includes zero, one, or both. Although such in-
tervals can be arrayed linearly, they conspicuously diﬀer from point-valued
probability. Yet f ð Þ is point-valued and contains all the information, and just
that information, which the two numbers do.
One dimension or two, which is it? Distinct information is oﬀered by the two
contributors to f ð Þ. The two strands are linearly consonant, however. The
f ð Þ ordering is not two dimensional in any sense which prevents it from
ordinally restating one-dimensional probabilistic orderings. As with possibility
and necessity when used by itself, any comparative thought expressed by f ð Þ
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ﬁnds a syntactically corresponding expression in some probability orderings,
and vice versa.
It is easily shown that no possibility ordering between mutually exclusive
sentences can be changed by introducing necessity. It follows that
f ðA:BÞP f ðB:AÞ () PðA:BÞP PðB:AÞ ð10Þ
and from (1), in the special case of linear possibility and strict atomic bound
probability,
pðAÞP pðBÞ () f ðA:BÞP f ðB:AÞ
In the other direction, we have
f ðAÞP f ðBÞ () PðAÞP PðBÞ and NðAÞPNðBÞ
and so, directly from (2) and (7):
f ðAÞP f ðBÞ () pðAÞP pðB:AÞ and pðA _ :BÞP pðBÞ
The f ð Þ composition based on general possibility and necessity also restates
the orderings which are unanimous in the solution set of an atomic bound
system. Using (10) along with (3a),
A >
 B() f ðA:BÞ > f ðB:AÞ
and since f ð Þ is a complete ordering,
A unordered wrt distinct B() f ðA:BÞ ¼ f ðB:AÞ
For the expression of f ð Þ orderings by an atomic bound solution sets
unanimous orderings, we have from the deﬁnition of f ð Þ along with (4a) and
(9a),
f ðAÞ > f ðBÞ () A:B >
 B or A:B >
 :A
with equality holding just when the conditions for both strict orderings of f ð Þ
values are not met.
4. Necessity’s enhancement of possibility’s compliance with quasi-additivity
Cox appears not to have considered the normative status of single functions
which combine two Cox-reasonable belief measures as f ð Þ does. He will not
ﬁgure in our discussions of f ð Þ. Considerations based upon de Finettis quasi-
additivity corroborate the impression of consensual reasonableness which the
results of the previous section convey, and set the stage for discussing where the
limits of consensus lie.
The tie-breaking f ð Þ ordering is a kind of quasi-additive extension of the
strict orderings in the underlying possibility distribution. That is, for general
(not just linear) possibilities,
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f ðAÞ > f ðBÞ ) PðA:BÞ > PðB:AÞ ð11Þ
To see this, we begin with a weakening of the deﬁnition of f ð Þ, that
f ðAÞ > f ðBÞ ) PðAÞ > PðBÞ or NðAÞ > NðBÞ
and consider in turn each case of the disjunction.
For the possibilistic inequality, we have already encountered the possibilistic
relationship
PðAÞ > PðBÞ ) PðA:BÞ > PðBÞ
Since B:A implies B, then by Łukasiewicz–Sugeno and transitivity,
PðAÞ > PðBÞ ) PðA:BÞ > PðB:AÞ ð12Þ
For the ties which are broken by necessity, by substitution into (12),
Pð:BÞ > Pð:AÞ ) PðA:BÞ > PðB:AÞ
Thus, by combining the two cases, we arrive at (11).
Necessity brings possibility closer to exhibiting a pattern of strict orderings
which comports with the teachings of de Finetti. Moreover, a typical proba-
bilist would agree with how every tie broken by necessity is resolved.
If pð Þ is any single solution of a general atomic bound probability whose
constraints agree with Pð Þ in the strict orderings of the atoms, then from (11)
and (3a),
f ðAÞ > f ðBÞ ) pðAÞ > pðBÞ
In words, the strict orderings in the tie-breaking f ð Þ composition are a subset
of the strict orderings in the related probabilistic orderings.
There is a limit to how fully necessity or anything else can achieve com-
pliance with quasi-additivity without introducing other changes in the under-
lying possibilistic ordering, restricting atomic ties, or limiting the number of
sentences. A complete transitive ordering which is based on max for mutually
exclusive sentences cannot generally be quasi-additive for all sentence pairs.
For example, consider the ordering among four non-intersecting sentences
A ¼
 B >
 C >
 D
From here on in the paper, the symbols {¼
, P
, >
} will denote relative
position in any ordering of sentences, not just orderings based on sets of
probabilities.
If quasi-additivity obtained in a max calculus, then we would have the cycle
A _ C ¼
 B _ C ðby quasi-additivityÞ >
 B _ D ðby quasi-additivityÞ
¼
 A _ C ðby maxÞ
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So, it is inevitable that necessity, like any general-purpose tie-breaking rule
which retains the possibilistic order of exclusive sentences, would leave some
ties unbroken.
5. A controversy about necessity’s performance during belief revision
The speciﬁc possibilistic ties which necessity does and does not resolve lead
to a breakdown in consensus when beliefs change. Even so, necessitys dynamic
behavior may not be outside the range of views entertained within the prob-
abilist community.
Consider four exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses whose possibilities are
ranked
A >
 B >
 C >
 D
and As possibility is one. Obviously, we have in a possibilistic ordering
B _ C ¼
 B _ D
which tie necessity cannot break because the liveliness of A forces a tie in ne-
cessity.
If we were later to learn that A is untrue, but the possibility ordering of the
remaining hypotheses is unchanged, then we arrive at
B _ C >
 B _ D
in the new f ð Þ ordering and in necessity itself, since A no longer defeats the
quasi-additive conclusion based on Cs advantage over D.
There we encounter an impasse in intuitions. That the elimination of an
alternative can change the credal order among the surviving hypotheses is
acceptable to some. It is, for example, the nub of the famous ‘‘Peter, Paul, and
Mary’’ case [2].
Many probabilists intuition diﬀers. Barring something special about how A
was eliminated, its demise would leave the survivors in the same order as before
in typical probabilist accounts of belief change. Since B, C, and D each imply
:A, then in all probability distributions pð Þ, it is a standard result that
pðB _ C j :AÞ > pðB _ D j :AÞ () pðB _ CÞ > pðB _ DÞ
Only additional information beyond the mere elimination of A could alter the
ordering among the surviving hypotheses for a typical probabilist.
It is somewhat ironic that if one simply leaves possibilistic ties intact, rather
than breaking some of them in a consensually normative manner, then no
dynamic controversy would arise. Conditioning can be deﬁned within a pos-
sibilistic framework, as Dubois and Prade [14] have done, so that order among
survivors is preserved when an alternative is eliminated.
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Dynamic controversy does not contradict the ﬁndings of probabilistic rea-
sonableness for necessity and for f ð Þ reported earlier. Commitment to a
probability-resembling representation of static beliefs does not imply adoption
of Bayesian conditioning as the exclusive mechanism of belief change [15].
Dempsters rule is one example [3], and Kyburg has favorably considered a
liberal approach to belief change [16]. Both authors are easily identiﬁed as
probabilists nevertheless.
The divergence of opinion between, and to some extent within, communities
will not be settled here. When discussing consensus, one must acknowledge the
boundary beyond which agreement is impossible. For necessity, that boundary
abuts territory where probabilists are in some disagreement among themselves.
6. The Polya domains and ‘‘heuristic’’
There are domains of uncertain reasoning in which necessity may experience
another diﬃculty which can render it unable to serve as a possibilistic tie
breaker. Interestingly, unaided possibility, ties and all, may be an especially
attractive reasoning tool in these domains.
A pioneer explorer of the domains is the mathematician George Polya [17].
His principal concern was reasoning about the possible truth of mathematical
conjectures, particularly as opinions in the matter change with the discovery of
implied, analogous, or otherwise intuitively related facts. Polya noted that this
domain was similar to the development of scientiﬁc theories and the determi-
nation of guilt in criminal investigations. Polya chose the name heuristic for the
ﬁeld of study which concerns the principles of reasoning in these domains.
Polya pursued his work from a consciously probabilistic perspective, freely
drawing on both Bayesian and Keynesian predecessors, supplemented with
some notions of his own. His resulting viewpoint was criticized by Bayesians,
e.g. de Finetti [18].
As to necessity, belief change by hypothesis elimination is commonplace in
these domains. Promising conjectures turn out to imply falsehoods, attractive
theories are experimentally falsiﬁed, and chief suspects are exonerated by the
discovery of unforeseen evidence. Opportunities for non-consensual dynamic
behavior abound.
Furthermore, the negation of a hypothesis is often unavailable for credal
evaluation with any useful speciﬁcity. For example, it is easy to think about the
credal signiﬁcance of ﬁnding a defendants DNA at the scene of a crime in
relation to the hypothesis that she is guilty. But what is ‘‘the’’ contrary hy-
pothesis? Would that be ‘‘not guilty, and the defendant has innocent access to
the scene,’’ or ‘‘not guilty, and contamination occurred,’’ or something else,
perhaps something not yet even considered?
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Both probability and possibility permit comparisons between sentences X
and Y that do not depend upon speciﬁcation of :X , :Y , nor :X:Y . This
property, sometimes called ‘‘independence of irrelevant alternatives,’’ is con-
sidered by some to be normatively desirable in its own right. In contrast, a
usefully speciﬁc ‘‘not X ’’ is required for the implementation of necessity.
The impracticality of speciﬁc negation would justify a divorce of possibility
from necessity, at least in these domains. In itself, the negation problem would
not forestall what might be called ‘‘contingent necessity,’’ the complement of
the possibility of all known alternatives. The lack of consensus surrounding
hypothesis elimination and with those who prefer independence of irrelevant
alternatives would persist, however.
There is also an aﬃrmative argument for leaving all ties unbroken if pos-
sibility were applied within the Polya domains. A distinctive feature of the
domains, not fully articulated by Polya himself, might be described as an
ambivalence about the goals of inference. The mathematician, scientist, and
jurist are all concerned with the discovery of truth. But that is not the whole of
their jobs.
Polya sought to counsel mathematicians about what problems are worth-
while to work on. Discovering the truth of some implication of a conjecture not
only encourages belief in the truth of the conjecture, but also establishes that
the conjecture has consequences, that it might explain those consequences, that
it is interesting.
Jurists self-consciously adopt rules of evidence which incorporate notions of
fairness as well as probative value. A revealing hearsay may be ruled out of
court not because it is uninformative, but because it would compromise a
defendants right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. The value to a prosecutor
of the hearsay might combine its importance as an indicator of the truth of the
charges along with its usefulness: whether or not the hearsay can fairly be in-
troduced as part of a court case.
Scientists sometimes engage in especially subtle inferential episodes. Theo-
ries may be judged on their tractability and elegance along with their ﬁdelity to
the experimental record. Beauty may also be a factor in scientiﬁc thought [19],
both as a value in its own right and as a heuristic guide to truth. As Roger
Penrose described his own pattern of thinking (quoted in [20]):
I have noticed on many occasions in my own work where there might, for
example, be two guesses that could be made as to the solution of a prob-
lem and in the ﬁrst case I would think how nice it would be if it were true;
whereas in the second case I would not care very much about the result
even if it were true.
Scientists conclusions may also be more complicated than a simple state-
ment of relative credibility. Newtonian mechanics survives in practice, despite
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its experimental falsiﬁcation. Physicists simultaneously accept incompatible
theories, such as wave and particle models of light as the occasion demands, or
tolerate the unresolved discrepancies between relativity and quantum me-
chanics.
Throughout the Polya domains, then, a ‘‘good’’ conclusion is not necessarily
determined by beliefs about the simple truth of the matter. The merit ascribed
to a hypothesis may reﬂect preference (interestingness, usefulness, fairness, . . .)
unrebutted by the evidence, rather than simply an assessment of likely truth
impelled by the evidence and prior knowledge.
If this characterization of expert goal-setting practice is accurate, then there
may be a role for an inferential calculus which serves both for reasoning about
preferences as well as for ordinary reasoning about credibility in the style of
Łukasiewicz–Sugeno.
7. A distinctive feature of the possibility calculus
The value of the Łukasiewicz–Sugeno insight is that it captures much of the
intuitive force of what people mean when they speak of credibility, while
preserving a high degree of generality. Suppose one set out to characterize
reasoning about preferences with a similar goal.
In a domain of mutually exclusive rewards, we see immediately that rea-
soning about preferences is conspicuously unlike Łukasiewicz–Sugeno. Oﬀered
the choice between
a commitment to be paid $5
a commitment to be paid $5 or else $1
the stronger, rather than the weaker, commitment may well be preferred. If the
issue were credibility, perhaps as judged by an onlooker wondering how much
money will change hands, then Łukasiewicz–Sugeno never disfavors the
weaker sentence.
But preference does not always follow logical strength. Between
a commitment to be paid $1
a commitment to be paid $5 or else $1
considerations of dominance at least weakly favor the weaker commitment in
this case.
This easy, homely example suggests one candidate for a general abstract
description of a preference ordering among sentences describing outcomes:
if A) B; then B >
 A implies B:A >
 A ð13aÞ
or equivalently in a complete ordering,
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if A) B; then AP
 B:A implies AP
 B ð13bÞ
As with Łukasiewicz–Sugeno, we would expect more from a practical calculus,
but it is plausible that we would not be content with less.
Although derived from an elementary observation about preference, rela-
tionship (13a,b) states one ordinal property of the ordinary Boolean logic, as
Łukasiewicz–Sugeno states another. The relationship also expresses a property
displayed by orderings of evidentiary support using ordinary conditional
probabilities. It is easily veriﬁed that for all probabilities pð Þ,
if A) B; then pðe j BÞ > pðe j AÞ implies pðe j B:AÞ > pðe j AÞ
That preference and conditional probabilities are so closely related is un-
surprising. Borch [21] showed that some expected utility models of preference
compute a probability of economic ruin conditioned upon a chosen act. All
conventional expected utility models can be viewed as computing a tight upper
bound on a similar conditional probability [22].
In comparing the two kinds of ordering criteria
Łukasiewicz–Sugeno : if A) B; then BP
 A
preference-support : if A) B; then AP
 B:A implies AP
 B
it is straightforward that a max rule for disjunctions satisﬁes both criteria.Max
is the only rule which relates sentences according to both criteria in a transitive
ordering.
Proposition. If {>
;¼
} is a transitive, Łukasiewicz–Sugeno, and preference-
support ordering in which all equivalent sentences are ranked equally, then if a is a
top atom in sentence A, then a ¼
 A.
Proof. If a is the only atom in A, then a is equivalent to A, and a ¼
 A. Oth-
erwise, let b be any atom in A other than a. By Łukasiewicz–Sugeno, a _ bP
 a.
Since a is a top atom, aP
 b, thus aP
 a _ b by preference-support, so
a ¼
 a _ b. Similarly, if a ¼
 a _ C, and aP
 d, then a ¼
 a _ C _ d, and so we
can construct the obvious induction over all the atoms in A, leading to
a ¼
 A. 
Possibility, the max calculus, stands alone therefore as the only completely
ordered calculus that is both Łukasiewicz–Sugeno and preference-support.
Any mechanism for tie breaking which acted on implications would force the
new combined calculus to be either Łukasiewicz–Sugeno alone, or preference-
support alone, or perhaps neither. The ties are how the possibility calculus
manages to walk the tightrope between the all-but-conﬂicting criteria.
Possibilitys twin aspect combining reasoning about credibility and about
preference or support may oﬀer a promising vehicle for investigations in
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Polyas realm of incompletely formulated alternatives and ambiguous infer-
ential goals. It may even provide a useful alternate formulation of Polyas
account of the territory. That possibility and probability are so closely related
suggests that such an alternative formulation could retain much of the intuitive
and normative force of Polyas original exposition.
During the course of a 1954 rebuttal to de Finetti [16, Chapter XV, Section
7], Polya speculated about the prospects for exploiting inﬁnitesimal expressions
within his heuristic. He did not develop this approach in much detail. However,
the by-now familiar relationships among default reasoning, inﬁnitesimal
probabilities, standard probabilities, and possibility strongly suggest that Polya
might have been open to a possibilistic exploration, had that calculus been
available to him.
8. Conclusions
The normative case in favor of necessity, both in its own right and as a tie-
breaking mechanism for possibility, is considerable. There is, however, a
principled disagreement among scholars when belief changes by hypothesis
elimination. Both necessity and the combination of necessity with possibility
falls on one side of this divide. Possibility itself, in some interpretations of its
conditioning behavior, can be placed on the other side along with typical in-
terpretations of probabilistic conditioning.
Unaided possibility seems well-suited for exploring interesting and im-
portant domains which engaged George Polya. Those domains reliance on
hypothesis elimination and their hostility to evaluation based on complemen-
tation diminish the appeal of necessity there.
Another feature of Polyas domains suggests that possibilitys ties might
best be left unbroken. Merit within the domains is often a combination of
both credibility and preference. Credibility orderings are frequently deﬁned by
reference to an intuitive criterion suggested by Łukasiewicz and revived by
Sugeno. A comparably general criterion is proposed here to characterize
preference orderings and those based upon evidentiary support.
Possibility and only possibility, unassisted by any mechanism for tie
breaking, gives rise to a complete ordering which represents both credibility
and preference according to these criteria. Possibilitys ties support its ability to
mirror the ambiguity of merit within Polyas domains. On some occasions,
then, the use of possibility without necessity may be attractive.
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